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Procedure, Defendant/Appellant Patrick C. Williams cites the 
following supplemental authority in support of his argument that 
a begrudging recommendation by the State also constitutes a 
violation of the plea bargain agreement: 
United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(vacating sentence because "it is improper for the 
prosecutor to inject material reservations about the 
agreement to which the government has committed 
itself"); see also id. at 271 (quoting Correale v. 
United States, 479 F.2d 944, 949 (1st Cir. 1973) ("a 
prosecutorial failure to fulfill a promise or to make a 
proper promise is not rendered harmless because of 
judicial refusal to follow the recommendation or 
judicial awareness of the impropriety"); United States 
v. Taylor, 77 F.3d 368, 371 (11th Cir. 1996) ("the 
government's begrudging recommendation was too little, 
too late to undo the effect of its breach"). 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
PATRICK COCO WILLIAMS 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950332-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) , whereby a defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree or capital felony. See also Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2) (a) . 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief 
or in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
When the prosecution and the defense both agree to a plea 
bargain arrangement, if the prosecution later unilaterally 
breaches its promises, does the court err in not fulfilling the 
initial promises? See (R 295-96) (preservation of issue)1. "A 
trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular 
deference." Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) 
("trial courts do not have discretion to misapply the law"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103; tampering with a witness, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508; and violation of a 
protective order, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-108, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding. 
On February 10, 1995, Mr. Patrick Williams entered pleas of 
guilty and mentally ill to the above charges in conformity with a 
plea bargain agreement. (R 255-68) . On April 21, 1995, the 
court imposed the following sentences: a zero-to-five year term 
for aggravated assault; a zero-to-five year term for tampering 
1
 In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971), 
defense counsel objected when the sentencing recommendation of 
one prosecutor differed from the promise made by another 
prosecutor who had negotiated the plea. Id. at 259. Such an 
objection, together with a request "to adjourn the sentence 
hearing in order to have time to prepare proof of the first 
prosecutor's promise [,]" id., apparently preserved the issue for 
appeal. A similar type of objection and request was made here. 
See (R 295-96). In the alternative, the Santobello case and the 
virtually identical circumstances existing here reflect "plain 
error" (error which is both obvious and harmful) or "exceptional 
circumstances" (safety device invoked to make certain that 
manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider 
an issue on appeal). State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-23 
(Utah App. 1991). 
2 
with a witness; and a one year term for violation of a protective 
order. (R 293). The terms for aggravated assault and tampering 
with a witness were imposed consecutively and the term for 
violation of a protective order ran concurrently with the other 
terms. (R 293-94). On April 28, 1995, following a brief 
continuance, see infra Statement of the Facts, the court 
reconsidered the sentence but left intact its original order. 
(R 298-308). This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 10, 1995, the State and Mr. Williams mutually 
agreed to a plea bargain. See (R 218-25) (attached as Addendum 
B). In exchange for Mr. Williams pleas of guilty and mentally 
ill to aggravated assault, tampering with a witness, and 
violation of a protective order, the State dismissed one count of 
aggravated burglary together with the following recommendations: 
The State recommends: (1) that the defendant be 
evaluated at the Utah State Hospital pursuant to his 
guilty and mentally ill plea; and (2) that the defendant 
be committed to the Department of Human Services for 
care and treatment, if deemed appropriate pursuant to 
the evaluation at the Utah State Hospital, and that the 
court retain jurisdiction, pursuant to § 77-16a-
202(1)(b), Utah Code Ann., and (3) that at the 
expiration of the care and treatment provided by the 
Department of Human Services, or if such care and 
treatment is deemed unnecessary after the evaluation at 
the Utah State Hospital, the court should recall 
jurisdiction over the defendant's sentence pursuant to § 
77-16a-202(1)(b) and place the defendant on probation; 
and (4) that the defendant shall not be sentenced to 
prison, but the State will recommend that he serve one 
year of jail, without credit for time served, as a 
condition of probation. 
(R 218). 
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The trial court indicated that it would likely follow the 
recommendations. (R 222); (R 259) (court also wanted to review 
the pre-sentence report). The entry of plea proceedings, dated 
February 10, 1995, were made in line with the agreed upon 
recommendations. 
At the time of sentencing, however, a prosecutor different 
from the one who had negotiated the plea bargain appeared on 
behalf of the State. (R 282) (sentencing proceedings, dated 
April 21, 1995) . The new prosecutor acknowledged the prior 
prosecutor's representations, (R 284), but rather than keeping 
those promises the State chose to submit the matter in accordance 
with the less palatable recommendation in the presentence report. 
(R 285). The presentence evaluation recommended a sentence of 
prison because "the Utah State Prison has the capacity to handle 
individuals with this type of behavioral condition[.]" (R 285). 
Besides reneging on its agreement to recommend treatment at 
the department of human services, (R 218) (recommendation #2), 
the State' breach altered the likelihood of probation and medical 
and psychological treatment in a facility better suited to 
address the care of Mr. Williams. Due to the sudden change in 
the State's position, Mr. Williams requested and received a one 
week continuance to speak with the prosecutor who had originally 
agreed to made the recommendations. (R 295-96). 
On April 28, 1995, the original prosecutor appeared and 
stated that the plea bargain recommendations were changed because 
of evaluations from the state hospital. (R 301). Due to 
4 
conflicting claims of malingering, the State recommended that the 
court retain jurisdiction by sending Mr. Williams to the state 
hospital for more extensive observation. (R 3 02). The court 
declined to alter its prior sentence. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
When a defendant fulfills his part of a bargain by agreeing 
to enter a plea pursuant to promises made by the prosecution, the 
prosecution must similarly fulfill any agreements that it makes. 
Mr. Williams kept his part of the bargain by entering his guilty 
and mentally ill pleas. The State, however, breached its promise 
of recommending probation and by submitting the matter at 
sentencing with a recommendation of prison. Despite the 
existence of the State's prior promises and the trial court's 
acknowledgment at the time together with its statement that it 
likely would follow them, the plea bargain arrangements were not 
subsequently followed. The promises which prompted Mr. Williams 
to enter his pleas should be enforced. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PROMISE BREACHED BY THE PROSECUTION SHOULD BE 
FULFILLED SINCE MR. WILLIAMS HONORED HIS PART OF THE 
BARGAIN 
In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), "we granted 
certiorari in this case to determine whether the State's failure 
to keep a commitment concerning the sentence recommendation on a 
guilty plea required a new trial." Id. at 257-58. The Court 
unanimously held that when a guilty plea rests in significant 
5 
part on a promise by the prosecution, the promise must be 
fulfilled. Id. at 263; accord North v. State, 878 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. 
App. 1994). 
In Santobello, as in the case at bar, the prosecution had 
entered into a plea bargain and made certain promises in exchange 
for the defendant's guilty plea(s). Compare 404 U.S. at 258 (two 
felony counts dropped, guilty plea entered for a lesser included 
offense), with (R 257-61) (first degree felony count dropped, 
guilty and mentally ill pleas entered for a two third degree 
felonies and a misdemeanor charge). 
Because the prosecution in Santobello had "agreed to make no 
recommendation as to the sentence[,]" 404 U.S. at 258, 
11
 [p] etitioner represented to the sentencing judge that the plea 
was voluntary and that the facts of the case, as described by the 
Assistant District Attorney, were true. The court accepted the 
plea and set a date for sentencing." Id. 
At sentencing, though, "another prosecutor had replaced the 
prosecutor who had negotiated the plea. The new prosecutor 
recommended the maximum one-year sentence. In making this 
recommendation, he cited petitioner's criminal record and alleged 
links with organized crime." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 259. 
In response, the trial court stated, "I am not at all 
influenced by what the District Attorney says, . . . It doesn't 
make a particle of difference what the District Attorney says he 
will do, or what he doesn't do." Id. "The judge then imposed 
the maximum sentence of one year." Id. at 260. 
6 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 
"Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an 
essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for 
many reasons." 404 U.S. at 261. "However, all of these 
considerations presuppose fairness in securing agreement between 
an accused and a prosecutor." Id. 
This phase of the process of criminal justice [entry 
of pleas], and the adjudicative element inherent in 
accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by 
safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably 
due in the circumstances. Those circumstances will 
vary, but a constant factor is that when a plea rests in 
any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled. 
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (emphasis added). 
The case at bar similarly requires fulfillment of the 
prosecution's promises. Mr. Williams, like Mr. Santobello, 
"'bargained' and negotiated for a particular plea in order to 
secure dismissal of more serious charges, . . . " Santobello, 404 
U.S. at 262; (R 218-25). 
The additional condition for Mr. Santobello's plea was "that 
no sentence recommendation would be made by the prosecutor." Id. 
But see 404 U.S. at 259 (the State later recommended a one-year 
term). An additional condition for Mr. Williams' plea was that 
"[Mr. Williams] shall not be sentenced to prison, but the State 
will recommend that he serve one year in jail without credit for 
time served as a condition of probation." (R 259). But see (R 
285) (the State later recommended treatment "either in prison or 
7 
at the state hospital"). The prosecution in both instances 
breached its promises. 404 U.S. at 259; (R 285). 
In addition, the trial court in each situation was not 
necessarily "influenced by what the District Attorney says": 
Nevertheless, we conclude that the interests of justice 
and appropriate recognition of the duties of the 
prosecution in relation to promises made in the 
negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by 
remanding the case to the state courts for further 
consideration. The ultimate relief to which petitioner 
is entitled we leave to the discretion of the state 
court, which is in a better position to decide whether 
the circumstances of this case require only that there 
be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in 
which case petitioner should be resentenced by a 
different judge, or whether, in the view of the state 
court, the circumstances require granting the relief 
sought by petitioner, i.e., the opportunity to withdraw 
his plea of guilty. 
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63. 
Mr. Williams is entitled to "specific performance of the 
agreement on the plea", id. at 263, with "considerable, if not 
controlling, weight [accorded Williams' preference] inasmuch as 
the fundamental rights flouted by a prosecutor's breach of a plea 
bargain are those of the defendant, not of the State." See id. 
at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring). As in Santobello, the judgment 
here should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Williams respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the lower court's order and enforce the promises in his plea 
bargain agreement. 
8 
SUBMITTED this day of October, 1995. 
5 
RONALD S. "FUJTNO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of October, 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony. 
76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another 
— Violation. 
Any person who has been restrained from abusing or contacting another or 
ordered to vacate a dwelling or remain away from the premises of the other's 
residence, employment, or other place as ordered by the court under a 
protective order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, 
or Title 78, Chapter 3a, who violates that order after having been properly 
served with it, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
76-8-508. Tampering with witness — Retaliation against 
witness or informant — Bribery — Communicat-
ing a threat. 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to 
induce or otherwise cause a person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has 
been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by 
another as a witness or informant; 
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of 
his doing any of the acts specified under Subsection (1); or 
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would 
believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of any act 
performed or to be performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or 
informant in an official proceeding or investigation. 
77-16a-202. Commitment to department. 
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally ill offender to the department 
under Subsection 77-16a-104(3)(a), the court shall: 
(a) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he 
be committed to the department for care and treatment until transferred 
to UDC in accordance with Sections 77-16a-203 and 77-16a-204; or 
(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he 
be committed to the department for care and treatment for no more than 
18 months, or until he has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs 
first. At the expiration of that time, the court may recall the sentence and 
commitment, and resentence the offender. A commitment and retention of 
jurisdiction under this subsection shall be specified in the sentencing 
order. If that specification is not included in the sentencing order, the 
offender shall be committed in accordance with Subsection (a). 
(2) The court may not retain jurisdiction, under Subsection (l)(b), over the 
sentence of a mentally ill offender who has been convicted of a capital offense. 
In capital cases, the court shall make the findings required by this section after 
the capital sentencing proceeding mandated by Section 76-3-207. 
(3) When an offender is committed to the department under Subsection 
(l)(b), the department shall provide the court with reports of the offender's 
mental health status every six months. Those reports shall be prepared in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 77-16a-203. Additionally, the 
court may appoint an independent examiner to assess the mental health status 
of the offender. 
(4) The period of commitment may not exceed the maximum sentence 
imposed by the court. Upon expiration of that sentence, the administrator of 
the facility where the offender is located may initiate civil proceedings for 
involuntary commitment in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 12 or Title 
62A, Chapter 5. 
ADDENDUM B 
RLEBB&niSCTCeURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDIcIA^^HsTR^df1"01 
STATE OF UTAH FEB 1 0 1995 
IT Lf.KE COUNTY 
/ ( . / / r ' M ^ By. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
Defendant. 
•? Deputy Clerk 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL & ORDER 
Criminal No. 9*4 iqnOJffi PS 
JUDGE WDY^^S ^ J b ^ A ^ 
the defendant COMES NOW, fhftjick^ (jXn [X)\\\\q^^0 
in this case and hereby acknowledges the following: 
I have entered a plea of . tguiltyi (no contest) to the 
following crime (s) : °*d tr><h^itJ}<A dj 
CRIME & STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
A. fyyyvwTiteJ fteaukr-
- <fib -s-io$ uifr 
B . UJuhM^V) "RvrspP^A. 
- ^ i b - T -5oT 0 ock 
^$>7k - 5 -\o% vcph 
PUNISI 
(Mtrr./u^ax. 
and/oa? 
Min. MdiiQdLury— 
Q-5 y s , pK/ws flWfo 
Pit) 5 ^ K . Qrw&r\ 0*+dy 
& 6,000 -fWJe, L^uoo 
DEGREE 
Ho^p^MJ 0-<_ G7w^-- !>Mv4^ MCrtjU ^ U ^ S ^ U C I W N ^ U O N -H-e_ (M<^f^-^-'i 
0-r\ ^ b c U i ^ r N • Q ^ (J) -f ls"^- M^< d £ 6 W * - w - *i^4jU AW'- be. W V & W N ^ fa 
of pA^bo^vr^-
I have received a copy of the (charge) CrnformationL 
against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and elements 
of the offense (s) for which I am pleading fg^ltyT) . (no contest). 
<*od r>rcsD^J^JX^\ iXJ 
The elements of the crime (s) of which I am charged are as 
follows: 
hi* <^Arlr\ ~*M^ <T\ ^CL. U J ^ J M t 8 ftwlu(&_ SPAUA/^ h a d J ^ u v > j ^ ^ . 
6 - Wl-rw>»?l^Wv.pg/UnrA: Uf})Jxwo^ frA-t Osr, o f f ic ia l pOCel>Aisr>A K ^€TAL^ \t> CdHe^pj-
^ My c o n d u c t , and t h e conduct of o t h e r p e r s o n s f o r which I am 
c r i m i n a l l y l i a b l e , t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e c r i m e ( s ) 
c h a r g e d a r e a s f o l l o w s : Qrr\ ennhcxi\~ feJ9. Z*> IMH (ti~m\ MtruK UMUUKO Sh ^ 
hjij- KenM, F~to^ AJLR^R (K SoncTur S>Wn>eJ ArKtciv QQUJJ&J tonyuAJu^ /WKMAJSKA 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as 
determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
-2-
600219 
2. I Xhave not)) (have) waived my right to counsel. Tfr 
I have waived my right to counsel,—I have done so Juiuwinyly;— 
infill i,jnnt"1y ™* imi mn ^IM iy r<» M.M r..n^wj ^ " g ^ ^ 
of guiltyO/rtfl /YWh^ JhdJ^  ^ * 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney 
Js^ jBflCYferflflJ IfelfrA^ ^kjdj^ and I have had an opportunity 
to discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my 
guilty plea with my attorney. 
' 5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish\to have a trial I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them 
cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to 
compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense to testify in 
court upon my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to do so I cannot be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be drawn 
against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me 
I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for 
trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the burden of 
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proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would have 
the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I 
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would 
be paid by the state, 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for 
each offense to which I plead (guilty)), (no contest) . -I know that 
-by pleading (guilty) (no contest) i-r> an nffpn^P fhnt rnrrim a 
minimum mandaLuiy sentence thau i will be oubjocting myself to • 
sei*ving d minimum mandatory oontonco for that offcncQ^. I know that 
the sentences may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, 
or both. I know that in addition to a fine an eighty-five percent 
(85%) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the court to make 
restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to more 
than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
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12. I know and understand that by pleading {cjuilty)) $W n^n-Mj}^ U 
(no contest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set 
out in the preceding paragraphs- I also know that by entering such 
plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the 
conduct alleged and I am guilty of%the crime(s) for which my plea(s) 
is/are entered. ' 
13. My plea(s) is/are the result of a plea bargain between 
myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and 
provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in the 
Plea Agreement attached to this affidavit. W ~ p^t ^ c . 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my 
plea(s) of q^uiltyj) (no contest) I must do so by filing a motion 
within thirty (3 0) 'days after entry of my plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the 
Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what 
they believe the court may do are. also not binding on the court. ^ Aje/V^
 y ^ 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises, except 
those contained herein and in the attached plea agreement, have been 
made to me. 
17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I 
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am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. I 
do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are 
correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
19. I am years of age; I have attended school 
through the | 6 grade and I can read and understand the English 
language* or an interpreter hab buuii provided to me. I was not under 
the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would 
impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s) . 
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or 
intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this 10 ^  day of febUMA^ , 19 ^ fT . 
^ 
D E F E N D A N T ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for fecKidL. C?G? [Uiih^r^j 
the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement 
or that I have read it to him/her and I have discussed it with 
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of 
my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's 
criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the 
other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
SV EOT. DEFENDANT/BAR NUMBER 
yW-&M^?7 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING "ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against PajnKdk^ (0G0 UJtlXjux^rs^ , defendant. I have 
reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that the 
declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) 
and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been 
offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the 
statement and in the attached plea agreement or as supplemented on 
-7-
000224 
record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that 
the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the 
offense (s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of 
the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
3SECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR J PROS NUMBER 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement 
and the certification of the defendant and counsel, the court 
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea of (guilty) 
(no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered 
that the defendant' plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the 
charge(s) set forth in the statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this / * day of 7Z*^C' , 19*7^ 
ISTRICT JUDGE 
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